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Fractographic Examination of the Vertical Stabilizer and 
Rudder from American Airlines Flight 587 
Matthew R. Fox* and Carl R. Schultheisz† 
National Transportation Safety Board, Washington D.C.  
James R. Reeder‡ 
NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA 23681 
The first major structural component failure of a composite part on a commercial 
airplane occurred during the crash of American Airlines Flight 587.  The fractured 
composite lugs that attached the vertical stabilizer to the aircraft tail and the fractured 
composite honeycomb rudder were examined as part of the National Transportation Safety 
Board investigation of the accident.  In this paper the composite fractures are described and 
the resulting clues to the failure events are discussed. 
I. Introduction 
On November 12, 2001, shortly after taking off from Kennedy International Airport, the composite vertical 
stabilizer and rudder separated from the fuselage of American Airlines Flight 587, rendering the airplane 
uncontrollable.  The Airbus A300-600 airplane crashed into a neighborhood in Belle Harbor, New York, killing all 
260 persons aboard the airplane and 5 persons on the ground.  This accident was unique partly in that it was the first 
time a major structural component fabricated out of composite material failed in flight on a commercial airplane.  
Analysis of the flight data recorder revealed the airplane had performed a series of yawing maneuvers in the 
seconds before separation of the vertical stabilizer, and the separation of the vertical stabilizer occurred while the 
airplane was pointed to the left of its flight path.  This orientation would have produced a bending moment on the 
vertical stabilizer leading to tension on the right-side attachments and compression on the left.  
The separated pieces of the vertical stabilizer and rudder were recovered away from the main crash site mainly 
from the water of Jamaica Bay.  The vertical stabilizer was largely intact, and had separated from the fuselage by 
fractures at the lower end where it had attached to the fuselage.  Many fractured pieces of the rudder were recovered 
near, but mostly fractured from, the vertical stabilizer.  As part of the overall investigation into the accident, a 
detailed examination of the fractures in the vertical stabilizer and rudder was conducted in order to determine the 
failure mechanism and direction of fracture propagation where possible, including assessing the possibility of any 
pre-existing damage or fatigue cracking.  
In addition, three subcomponent tests were conducted on aft lugs from an unused skin panel and from another 
airplane using accident loads derived from analysis of recorded flight data.  Fracture patterns for these three test 
specimens were compared to the corresponding structure on the accident airplane.  
In this paper, the structures of the vertical stabilizer and rudder are described.  Next, results of the fractography 
of the vertical stabilizer and rudder are presented and the interpretation of the results toward understanding the 
failure is discussed.  Finally, fractographic examination results of the three subcomponent tests are presented and 
significance of the fracture features are discussed. 
II. Description of Structures 
Development of the Airbus A300-600 model began in 1980, and certification occurred in 1984.  The vertical 
stabilizer and rudder for the accident airplane, delivered new in 1988, had a symmetric airfoil shape.  The vertical 
stabilizer and rudder were 27 feet 3 inches tall.  From leading edge to trailing edge the width of the vertical stabilizer 
and rudder was 25 feet at the base and 10 feet 2 inches at the tip. 
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A. Vertical Stabilizer Structure  
The vertical stabilizer for the Airbus A300-600 airplane was a stiffened box with removable leading edge 
fairings and trailing edge panels.  An internal view drawing of the vertical stabilizer is shown in Figure 1.  The 
stiffened box consisted of two integrally stiffened skin panels for the left and right sides, spars for the forward and 
aft sides, and closure ribs at the upper and lower ends.  The integral stiffeners in the skin panels consisted of 24 “I”-
shaped stringers that extended spanwise parallel to the aft spar, numbered from the aft to forward.  Internal stiffeners 
for the box consisted of a center spar at the lower end of the span and 16 ribs, not including the two closure ribs.  
The ribs were numbered from the lower end upward starting with the lower closure rib.  The components of the box 
were riveted together, and the leading edge fairings and trailing edge panels were attached with threaded fasteners. 
Except for the fasteners, lightning protection strips, and trailing edge panel support frames, the vertical stabilizer 
was made entirely of composite materials.  The stiffened box of the vertical stabilizer was a solid carbon-fiber 
reinforced polymer (CFRP) laminate composed of T300 carbon fibers in a CIBA 913 epoxy matrix.  The laminate 
included both unidirectional tape and eight-harness satin fabric layers in the construction.  The zero-degree fibers of 
the fabric and tape layers in the composite were oriented parallel to the stringers and aft spar, which was at an angle 
of 33.3 degrees aft of vertical.  The leading edge fairings and the trailing edge panels for the vertical stabilizer were 
sandwich composites having a Nomex honeycomb core and glass-fiber reinforced polymer (GFRP) facesheets on 
the leading edge fairings and both GFRP and CFRP facesheets for the trailing edge panels. 
The main attachment locations for the vertical stabilizer were six CFRP lugs (main lugs) that connected by bolts 
approximately 2 inches in diameter to six metal clevis fittings on the fuselage.  A schematic view of the typical 
assembly cross-section is shown in Figure 2 (drawing of lug cross-section).  After the assembly was cured, the lug 
attachment bolt holes were core-drilled out.  Three main lugs extended from the lower end of each of the two 
vertical stabilizer skin panels.  At the thickest point, the main lugs 
were approximately 1.62 inches, 2.48 inches, and 2.17 inches thick 
for the forward, center, and aft lugs, respectively.  The aft lugs 
alone each had more than 170 layers composed of approximately 50 
percent ±45-degree fabric, 25 percent 0/90-degree fabric, and 25 
percent 0-degree tape.  The thickness of each lug decreased as plies 
were dropped in the lug-to-skin transition area.  The skin layers 
were made of ±45-degree fabric.  The I-shaped stiffeners had 0-
degree tape at the caps and ±45-degree fabric in the web.   
Each lug contained two separate pieces that were cured 
separately before the final assembly.  In the final assembly, the 
outer precured half was laid down, followed by the skin layers, then 
the inner precured half, the compensation layers, the rib 1 attach 
flange, the stringer inner flange (tape) layers, and the stringer 
module layers.   
 
Figure 1.  Airbus A300-600 vertical stabilizer 
construction. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Drawing of main lug 
cross-section. 
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Six smaller composite lugs (transverse lugs) attached the vertical stabilizer to the fuselage by lateral yokes.  Two 
of these transverse lugs extended from the lower end of each of the three spar webs.  These lugs were approximately 
0.47 inch thick. 
B. Rudder Structure  
The rudder was a single-segment wedge-shaped box design with removable leading edge fairings.  The wedge 
consisted of left and right skin panels with a single spar at the forward side.  The skin panels were fastened together 
at the trailing edge by rivets with a metallic strip on each side.  Threaded through-bolts near the trailing edge also 
helped fasten the two skin panels.  At the lower end, a metal strap, which retained the rubber lower sealing strip, was 
attached by threaded fasteners that also connected the skin panels to the lower rib.  The spar was riveted to the skin 
panels.  Pieces of the leading edge fairings were attached to the skin panels with threaded fasteners and to each other 
with threaded fasteners through metal support flanges.  There were no internal stiffeners in the wedge.  Closure ribs 
cap the upper and lower ends of the rudder. 
The rudder skin panels and spar were sandwich composite panels.  Each panel had a Nomex honeycomb core 
and GFRP and CFRP face sheets.  The leading edge fairings were sandwich composites with GFRP facesheets. 
The rudder was attached to the vertical stabilizer by seven hinges, numbered from the lower end upward.  There 
were three rudder position actuators that control the rotation of hinges 2, 3, and 4.  Each hinge was composed of two 
aluminum alloy fittings pinned together at the hinge line.  The forward fittings were attached to the vertical stabilizer 
with bolts that fastened to CFRP flanges on the vertical stabilizer aft spar.  Spherical bearings were located at each 
attach point for the forward fitting.  The aft fittings were attached to the rudder spar using bolts that threaded into 
barrel nuts located in fiberglass blocks embedded in the rudder skin panels aft of the rudder spar. 
  
III. Fractographic Examination Procedures and Challenges 
For most common airplane structural metals, visual inspection or low-power magnification is often sufficient to 
determine fracture mechanism and direction.  For metals, the fracture plane, surface roughness, radial marks, 
chevrons, shear lips, and general deformation when present all provide macroscopic clues to the fracture 
mechanisms, direction of fracture propagation, and relative motion of mating surfaces.  Preexisting cracks in metals 
often show staining or changes in color associated with corrosion1.  Using these clues, large areas of damaged 
structure can be examined relatively quickly by an experienced investigator to identify fracture origins and areas 
requiring closer inspection.   
The fractographic examination of the composite fractures in the accident vertical stabilizer presented a challenge 
in that it was more extensive than what is typically required for an overstress fracture of a similar metal structure.  
Visual clues to preexisting fractures, such as flat fracture features with curving boundaries or staining from 
corrosion that can be readily observed in structural metals, generally are not readily visible in composites.  
Furthermore, the visual cues to fracture propagation directions that are sometimes apparent in composite structures, 
such as crack branching in translaminar fractures (fractures that break fibers) or banding in delaminations (fractures 
between layers), were not apparent in many of the fractures of interest.  In determining the failure mechanism and 
directions in the vertical stabilizer and rudder during the accident investigation, fine fracture features were examined 
at high magnification across relatively large areas of the fracture surfaces in order to determine fracture mechanisms 
and propagation directions, a time-consuming process for the failure investigation.  However, since fatigue fractures 
and other preexisting cracks may appear similar during a macroscopic examination, the detailed inspection using 
high magnification was required to complete the fractographic analysis.   
The fractographic examination of the translaminar fractures and delaminations of the vertical stabilizer and 
rudder incorporated visual examination and scanning electron microscopy (SEM).  The visual examination included 
the documentation of the macroscopic fracture features.  The documentation included mapping of fractures, which 
could be used to aid in identifying fracture propagation directions from crack branching patterns.  Also, macroscopic 
indications of translaminar fracture under tension or compression were documented.  On delaminations, surfaces 
were examined for changes in reflectivity, which could indicate changes in fracture mechanism or mode2.  However, 
for most of the fracture surfaces, SEM was required to determine the fracture mechanism and fracture propagation 
direction. 
SEM examination of translaminar fracture surfaces was used to determine the fracture mechanism and 
propagation directions, and SEM examination of delamination surfaces was used to identify the layers involved, 
fracture mechanisms, modes of fracture, and propagation directions.  Additionally, results of the examination were 
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used to check the construction against the manufacturing drawings and to determine how the fractures related to the 
loading of the overall structure.   
Over 300 SEM photographs were taken of translaminar fractures in the main attachment areas of the vertical 
stabilizer, and more than 150 square inches of delamination surface areas were examined at high magnification.  
Examined fracture surfaces were coated with a conductive layer of gold and palladium.  For translaminar fractures 
intersecting the lug attachment hole, the entire fracture surfaces were examined at high magnification, and for 
translaminar fractures above the lug holes, several inches of the fracture were examined at high magnification.  
Samples for the SEM examination of the delamination surfaces were typically approximately two inches square and 
were taken from widely spaced areas on the exposed fracture surfaces in an effort to identify the overall trends.  
Samples were also taken across areas where the delamination surface morphology changed (mostly as a result of the 
ends of plies in the lay-up) to explore for local differences in stress state or crack propagation direction.  Two 
samples, one from each of the two large delaminations, were not cleaned and were the first ones examined in order 
to explore the surface for matrix rollers, which would have been an indication of fatigue3.  Since uncleaned samples 
were covered in debris, all other fracture surfaces were ultrasonically cleaned in water before coating.   
Another challenge for the fractographic analysis was the relatively small amount of fractographic reference 
material dealing specifically with fabric-reinforced composites.  Most of the literature describing fractography of 
composites focused on unidirectional tape lay-ups.  However, fabrics have unique characteristics that lead to 
features such as more variation in resin content on delamination surfaces and less fiber pullout in translaminar 
fractures relative to tape-reinforced materials.  The presence of woven fabric in the construction led to some 
interesting phenomena that could be useful in better analyzing composites failures.  In the unidirectional lay-ups, 
river marks were typically only observed in Mode I loading.  However, in the fabric construction, river marks also 
could be found in matrix-rich areas in the vicinity of the bundle crossings, and could be seen in the base of hackles 
in the transition from a bundle at one orientation to a perpendicular crossing bundle.  The river marks in the matrix-
rich bundle crossings were used to identify a general direction of fracture propagation upward and aftward for both 
of the large delaminations (at the forward left and aft left attachments).  The use of the river marks at the base of the 
hackles was explored in the examination of the delaminations at the forward right lug.  As composites with fabric 
reinforcements are being increasingly used in airplane structures, more research is needed in characterizing these 
fracture surfaces generated under controlled laboratory conditions to assist the failure analyst in interpreting 
fractographic details. 
IV. Fracture Surface Observations and Discussion 
A. Stabilizer Damage 
The vertical stabilizer was largely 
intact with no significant areas of skin 
buckling.  An overall view of the vertical 
stabilizer as it was being recovered from 
the water of Jamaica Bay is shown in 
Figure 3.  At the lower end, each of the 
six attachment locations were separated 
either by fractures that intersected the 
lug attach hole or by fractures through 
the structure above the hole.  A 
schematic drawing of the lower end of 
the vertical stabilizer is shown in Figure 
4, where a general fracture location for 
each lug is shown with overall views of 
each of these lug fractures.  Portions of 
rib 1, the rib 1 rib-to-skin attach angle, 
and the lower end of the forward spar 
also were fractured.  Along the trailing 
edge, the trailing edge panels were 
damaged in several locations.  A more 
detailed description of the damage is 
presented in reference 4. 
 
Figure 3.  Vertical stabilizer as recovered from Jamaica Bay. 
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B. Description of main lug fractures 
The right aft, right forward, and left forward main lugs had translaminar fractures that intersected the attachment 
hole, and the remaining lugs had translaminar fractures in the structure above the lug.  Each of the lugs had 
delaminations in the lug area and/or in the structure above the lug.  Details of the fractographic examination are 
presented in references 5 and 6.  Some of the delaminations extended into the main portion of the vertical stabilizer, 
and the extents of these delaminations were determined using nondestructive inspection (NDI), including ultrasonic 
inspection and x-ray-computed tomography scanning and imaging.  Results of the NDI of the vertical stabilizer are 
presented in references 7 and 8. 
1. Macroscopic fracture features 
The main lug translaminar fractures on the right side of the vertical stabilizer generally had rough fracture 
features consistent with overstress fracture in primarily tensile loading.  Delaminations were observed at the edges 
of each of the lugs on the right side.  The extent of the delaminations as determined using NDI was limited to within 
the fractured lugs or within approximately four inches of a translaminar fracture. 
The right aft lug failed by translaminar fracture through the bolt hole as shown in Figure 5.  The translaminar 
fracture surfaces had a rough appearance consistent with fracture primarily under tensile loading.  Fractures on each 
leg of the lug were on different translaminar planes, and the change in planes occurred near the center of the lug 
thickness.  On the aft side of the bolt hole, the outboard side of the fracture was in a plane nearly perpendicular to 
the zero-degree fiber direction, and the inboard side of the fracture was in a plane approximately parallel to the 45-
degree fiber direction.  On the forward side of the bolt hole, the outboard side of the fracture was in a plane 
approximately parallel to the zero-degree fiber direction, and the inboard side of the fracture was in a plane nearly 
 
Figure 4.  Overall views of main lug fractures with relative locations on vertical stabilizer.
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parallel to rib 1.  Bearing 
damage was observed at the 
bore surface near both 
fracture surfaces, as indicated 
by white unlabeled arrows in 
Figure 5. 
The right center lug failed 
above the bolt hole in the lug-
to skin transition above rib 1.  
Translaminar fracture 
features were relatively 
rough, consistent with 
overstress fracture under 
tensile loading. 
Fractures on the right 
forward lug intersected the 
lug hole.  Translaminar 
fracture features were 
relatively rough, consistent 
with overstress fracture under 
tensile loading.  Some 
evidence of local compressive 
loading was observed near 
the aft side of the lug, 
indicating that fracture occurred at the forward side first, and then the lower ligament hinged about the aft side. 
The main lug translaminar fractures on the left side of the vertical stabilizer also generally had rough fracture 
features consistent with overstress fracture in primarily tensile loading, but they also showed indications of bending 
to the left.  The left forward lug had multiple delaminations in the lug area and an impression on the left side 
corresponding to contact with the fuselage attachment clevis.  The impression indicates the left skin panel of the 
vertical stabilizer bent to the left and in order to obtain the bending displacement required, the right side skin panel 
must have separated from the fuselage first.  The left forward lug also had a delamination extending upward into the 
structure up to 43 inches from the lower end.  The left center lug had an area with compression fracture features at 
the outboard side of the translaminar fracture, consistent with bending loads to the left.  The left aft lug had 
delaminations extending up to 37 inches from 
the lower end.  Multiple delaminations 
through the thickness were present in the lug-
to-skin transition area, allowing layers 
associated with lug to separate from the rest 
of the structure.   
2. Microscopic fracture features 
On translaminar fractures, the ends of 
some fibers were oriented roughly 
perpendicular to the fracture plane.  A typical 
SEM view of these fiber ends on one of the 
translaminar fracture surfaces is shown in 
Figure 6.  Fiber ends such as those shown in 
Figure 6 were examined using SEM to help 
determine the fracture mechanism and 
propagation direction.  For fibers having 
radial patterns indicative of tensile fracture, 
the local fracture propagation direction could 
be determined from the direction of the radial 
pattern of several fibers9,10.  Then, general 
directions of fracture propagation for the 
translaminar fractures could be determined 
by averaging the directions indicated by the 
 
Figure 5.  Right aft lug translaminar fractures (pictured from below the lug). 
 
Figure 6.  Fractured carbon fibers showing crack growth 
directions.
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radial patterns across many areas of the fracture surfaces.  Also, 
since fatigue and overstress fractures can appear similar from a 
macroscopic view, the microscopic examination of the fracture 
surfaces included looking for evidence of fatigue such as 
rounded edges on fiber ends11 or striations in the matrix3,10,12, 
however, no evidence of fatigue was observed on any of the 
translaminar fracture surfaces. 
At high magnification, fiber end fractures for fibers oriented 
perpendicular to the fracture plane generally showed radial 
fracture features consistent with fracture under tensile loading.  
In an area near the outboard surface of the left center lug, fiber 
ends showed chop marks (lines across the fiber ends), 
indicative of local compressive loading. Examples of these 
chop marks can be seen in Figure 7 on the fiber ends marked 
with a “C”.  The combination of tension on the inside edge and 
compression on the outboard surface is associated with an 
overall lug bending to the left. Using the radial patterns on the 
lug translaminar fractures, fracture propagation directions were 
determined to be extending from the lug holes for the right aft, 
right forward, and left forward lugs (all lugs that had fractures 
intersecting the lug hole).  For the right center lug, fracture 
propagated from aft to forward, and for the left center and left 
aft lugs, fracture propagated from forward to aft. 
Samples of the delamination fracture surfaces were examined in the scanning electron microscope to determine 
the orientation of the shear stress at the fracture and to identify the direction of crack propagation.  Fracture features 
that were used to make these determinations included hackles (thin plates of fractured matrix material between 
fibers oriented perpendicular to the fiber axis, with free edges that point in a general direction opposite to the local 
shear applied at the fracture surface)13,14 and river marks (related to the initiation of matrix cracks that coalescence 
into larger cracks, indicating the direction of propagation)2.  A typical view of hackles and river marks observed on 
one of the delaminations is shown in Figure 8.  The samples also were carefully examined for indications of fatigue 
crack propagation, such as striations in the fiber impressions in the matrix3,10, matrix rollers (pieces of fractured 
matrix material rolled into cylindrical shapes by the relative motion of the fracture surface during cyclic loading)3,10, 
or rubbed hackle formations3, however no evidence of fatigue was observed on any of the delamination surfaces. 
When hackles form in CFRP’s, the hackles orient perpendicular to the fiber axes, so the hackles in the orthogonal 
bundles of the woven fabric would generally point in two orthogonal directions.  In some cases, the superimposed 
imprints of unidirectional tape at 45° to those 
bundles also added hackles at a third direction.  
Hackles also point generally opposite the 
locally applied shear at the fracture surface, so 
the multiple orientations of hackles from the 
different fiber bundles bound the direction of 
the local shear within an angle of 90°.   
River marks were observed in matrix-rich 
areas in the vicinity of the bundle crossings, 
and could be seen in the base of hackles in the 
transition from a bundle at one orientation to a 
perpendicular crossing bundle.  The river 
marks in the matrix-rich bundle crossings 
were used to identify a general direction of 
fracture propagation upward and aftward for 
both of the large delaminations (at the forward 
left and aft left attachments).  The use of the 
river marks at the base of the hackles to 
determine delamination growth direction was 
explored in the examination of the 
delaminations at the forward right lug. 
 
Figure 7.  Fractured carbon fibers showing 
compression chop marks (C). 
 
Figure 8.  Delamination fracture features. 
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At the matrix-rich areas where bundles crossed, 
some porosity was observed having a somewhat 
angular appearance as shown in Figure 9.  These 
pores were identified as arising from excess curing 
agent that had crystallized within the matrix.  Such 
crystals could have been physically removed in the 
fracture process or dissolved by the water from 
which the vertical stabilizer was recovered. 
On the delamination surfaces at the left forward 
lug, hackles on average pointed downward and 
forward on the outboard side of the delamination 
and upward and aft on the mating side, indicating a 
shear direction consistent with fracture under 
tensile loading and/or bending to the left.  River 
patterns coalesced upward and aft, indicating crack 
propagation extending upward from the lower end.   
On the delamination surfaces at the left aft lug, 
hackles on average pointed downward and forward 
on the side of the delamination associated with the 
lug layers, and on average pointed upward and aft on the mating sides, consistent with the lug pieces moving 
downward relative to the remaining structure.  In the portion of the delamination above the lug-to-skin transition, 
hackles generally pointed downward and forward on the outboard side and upward and aft on the mating side, 
indicating a shear direction consistent with fracture under bending to the left.  River patterns generally coalesced 
upward and aft, indicating crack propagation extending upward from the lower end.  No evidence of fatigue, such as 
striations in the matrix or edge rounding of the fiber ends on the translaminar fracture surfaces or matrix rollers or 
striations on the delamination surfaces, was observed on any of the 
fractures. 
A summary of the observed fracture patterns is shown in Figure 
10.  The schematic drawing represents a horizontal cross-section of 
the vertical stabilizer through the main attachment lugs as viewed 
from above.  Lug cross-sections with a light band at the center 
represent the lugs that failed through the bolt hole.  Solid lug cross-
sections represent fractures above the bolt holes.  Arrows on the lug 
surfaces indicate the approximate direction of fracture observed on 
the translaminar surface.  On the left center lug, the area of 
compression fracture features near the outboard side is indicated. The 
results showed that the failure pattern of fracture in tension on the 
right side was consistent with an overall bending of the vertical 
stabilizer to the left.  On the left side, the failure pattern of tension 
and bending to the left was consistent with an overall bending of the 
vertical stabilizer to the left after fracture of the lugs on the right side. 
It was noted that the only compression translaminar failure 
features were present on the vertical stabilizer at the outboard side of 
the center aft lug.  Typically, composites have less strength in 
compression than tension.  However, the design of the vertical 
stabilizer was such that the magnitude of the lug failure loads in 
tension were less than in compression. Furthermore after failure of 
the lugs on the right side, the curvature of the panel would cause 
tension loading in the forward and aft lug and compression in the 
center lug with continued bending to the left.  Other unknown factors, 
such as changes in air loading as the vertical stabilizer deflected after 
the initial fractures on the right side, would further influence the 
failure patterns on the left side. 
 
Figure 9.  Porosity in matrix rich regions where 
bundles cross. 
 
Figure 10.  Main lug fracture pattern 
summary (viewed from above). 
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C. Description of the rudder damage 
Approximately 95% of the rudder was 
recovered in numerous pieces.  Two pieces of 
the rudder leading edge fairing and one piece 
of the rudder right skin panel were recovered 
on land.  The remaining pieces of the rudder 
were recovered from Jamaica Bay.  An 
overall view of the damage patterns on the 
rudder is shown in Figure 11.  Detailed 
description of the visible damage is presented 
in reference 4.  Results of NDI on the rudder 
are presented in reference 7.   
Many areas of the rudder had facesheets 
that fractured from the honeycomb core.  The 
facesheet-to-honeycomb fractures had 
features consistent with laboratory peel test 
fracture features.  A description of the 
laboratory peel tests is presented in reference 
15.  Metal strips at the leading and trailing 
edges of the skin panels had features 
consistent with overstress fracture with no 
evidence of fatigue. 
All but one (the hinge 1 aft fitting) of the 
14 rudder-to-stabilizer hinge fittings were 
recovered, either attached to the vertical 
stabilizer or to the rudder.  Forward pieces of 
several fractured attachment bolts were not 
recovered.  Hinge and attachment bolt 
fractures at the rudder hingeline were 
consistent with overstress fracture, and no 
evidence of fatigue was observed. 
Portions of the rudder skin panels were 
examined using several NDI techniques 
including x-ray radiography, Lamb wave imaging, thermography, ultrasonic inspection, and tap testing.  Generally, 
no evidence of debonding or water ingression was observed in areas away from visible fracture locations. 
The rudder had a chordwise fracture through the skin panels on both sides of the rudder near hinge 4 as 
highlighted in Figure 11.  The fractured facesheets of the honeycomb panels in this region were examined.  The only 
fibers running perpendicular to the fractured surface were 
glass fibers in the adhesive layer that bonded the facesheet 
to the Nomex core.  Chop marks indicating compression 
failure were found on some of the glass fibers on the inner 
and outer facesheet on the left side of the rudder and were 
also found on the inner facesheet on the right hand side. 
No compression markings were found on the outside 
facesheet of the right side.  An explanation of how these 
failures occurred would be that the left side failed first due 
to a bending moment to the left.  Once the left side failed 
the right side sandwich panel would carry the bending 
moment putting the inside facesheet in compression. 
A large section of facesheet was peeled from the 
Nomex core in the area of hinges 2, 3, and 4.  The 
facesheet was not recovered, but the fractured adhesive 
attached to honeycomb was examined and found to have 
step and scalloping features as seen in Figure 12 that 
indicated a fracture direction.  River markings found in the 
scalloped region supported this interpretation of the 
 
 
Figure 11.  Rudder visible damage. 
 
 
Figure 12.  Fracture of the rudder honeycomb 
core from the facesheet. 
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fracture growth direction.  From samples taken from three separate regions, the facesheet appeared to have been 
peeled from the forward side of the rudder skin panel toward the trailing edge.  
In summary, no evidence of significant preexisting damage was observed on the rudder.  Furthermore, airplane 
performance analysis based on information from the flight data recorder showed the rudder performed as expected 
until the vertical stabilizer separated from the fuselage.  Also, a structural analysis showed that the aerodynamic 
loads on the rudder prior to separation of the vertical stabilizer from the fuselage were insufficient to cause failure.  
Therefore, damage to the rudder was considered secondary to the failure of the vertical stabilizer. 
V. Subcomponent Tests 
 Structural analysis indicated that under accident loading conditions, fracture of the vertical stabilizer would have 
intitated at the right aft lug.  Three aft lugs were obtained for mechanical testing using applied loads that were 
derived from recorded flight data from the accident.  The lug for the first test was obtained from a production left 
skin panel that had sections cut from it for destructive testing, but the aft lug had been left undisturbed.  The lugs for 
the second and third tests were obtained from a vertical stabilizer that had been removed from service after 
experiencing loads exceeding design limit loads.  The three vertical stabilizer aft lug specimens were tested at 
Airbus Industrie under National Transportation Safety Board supervision in a loading fixture that applied prescribed 
forces and moments to the lugs.  Testing of each lug continued until a translaminar fracture was observed.  The 
fracture loads for these three tests were consistent with calculated accident loads and with earlier tests completed by 
Airbus Industrie during certification.  Details of the test procedures and results are documented in references 16-20.  
A fractographic examination of each of the lugs was conducted after completing the tests as documented in 
reference 21. 
 Before testing, each lug was examined for non-visible defects or damage using ultrasonic inspection.  Results of 
these inspections are documented in reference 21.  No defects were observed in the first test lug.  Some damage was 
detected in each of the second and third test lugs near the lug attachment hole and in some areas in the lug fitting 
assembly transition area above the lowermost rib, however these lugs had experienced in-service loads exceeding 
design limit loads.  Following the tests, the lugs were examined again using ultrasonic inspection.  The post-testing 
ultrasonic inspection showed that the preexisting damage in these lugs grew in size during the testing. 
 Overall views of the lugs from each test are shown in Figure 13 (outboard surface view).  A similar view of the 
accident right aft lug also is shown in Figure 13.  Unlabeled red arrows indicate where translaminar fractures 
intersected the outboard surfaces of the lugs, and an unlabeled large green arrow indicates loading direction (the 
force vector for the horizontal and vertical loading components for each lug).  The lugs from the first and second 
tests were left aft lugs, 
and as such, the 
orientations are mirror 
images of the accident 
right aft lug and the 
third test lug. 
 Results from the 
fractographic 
examination showed 
that fractures in the test 
lugs occurred at 
locations similar to 
those on the accident 
right aft lug.  In the 
first test, loading was 
interrupted after 
fracture occurred as 
shown in Figure 13.  
The translaminar 
fracture was located at 
a position on the 
forward part of the lug 
in a plane nearly 
parallel to the resultant 
 
Figure 13.  Aft lugs from accident and subsequent subcomponent tests. 
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force direction, similar to one of the translaminar fractures in the accident right aft lug.  Fracture features for the lugs 
from tests 2 and 3 were similar to each other.  The outboard side of each of these lugs had a translaminar fracture on 
the forward sides of the holes in a plane nearly parallel to the loading direction and another translaminar fracture at 
the aft side of the hole in a plane approximately perpendicular to the loading direction, fractures similar to that of the 
accident lug.  In addition on the outboard sides, a compression buckling fracture was observed on the forward sides 
of each lug above the fracture parallel to the loading direction, which is different from features on the accident lug 
but was attributed to constraints of the loading fixture.  On the inboard sides of lugs 2 and 3, fracture locations were 
on translaminar planes different from that of the outboard side of the lug.  This change in fracture planes was similar 
to that of the accident right aft lug. 
A delamination was present within the first test lug having an extent similar to that of the accident right aft lug 
and in a location through the thickness slightly outboard of that of the accident right aft lug.  Delaminations also 
were detected above the translaminar fractures in lugs 2 and 3.  In lugs from tests 2 and 3, the locations of the 
delaminations through the thickness were similar to that of the accident right aft lug, but the extents of the 
delaminations in the test lugs were slightly less. 
Each subcomponent test lug had translaminar fractures that intersected the lug hole and had delaminations that 
were located within the lug, features similar to the accident right aft lug.  Each lug had a translaminar fracture at the 
forward lower side of the hole on the outboard side of the lug, including the first test, which was interrupted and had 
no other translaminar fractures.  The fracture at the forward lower side of the hole corresponds to one of the 
translaminar fracture locations on the accident lug.  The second test lug showed changes in translaminar fracture 
planes that were qualitatively similar to that of the accident right aft lug.  These results indicated that the accident 
right aft lug had fracture features consistent with being the first lug fracture from a substantially intact vertical 
stabilizer and rudder under accident load conditions. 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
The fractographic examination revealed no evidence of pre-existing damage or fatigue cracking in the vertical 
stabilizer or rudder, supporting the conclusion that the separation of the vertical stabilizer and rudder was a result of 
high aerodynamic loads.  The fractographic results of examination of the main attachment lugs for the vertical 
stabilizer showed that failures on the right side of the vertical stabilizer were overstress failures under tension 
loading, consistent with an overall bending of the vertical stabilizer to the left.  Fractographic results for the main 
lugs on the left side of the vertical stabilizer showed overstress failure in tension and bending to the left, consistent 
with bending of the vertical stabilizer to the left after failure of the main lugs on the right side.  The structural 
analysis of the vertical stabilizer and rudder also conducted as part of the overall investigation indicated that under 
accident loads, fracture of the vertical stabilizer would initiate at the right aft main lug, which was consistent with 
the fractographic analysis. 
The failure mode in the accident was further confirmed by a series of three aft lug subcomponent tests.  The 
failure loads for these three tests were consistent with predicted failure loads and with earlier tests completed by 
Airbus Industrie during certification.  Fracture patterns for the three test specimens were compared to the 
corresponding structure on the accident airplane, and good correlation was observed. 
The analysis of the fractographic evidence was incorporated into the overall analysis of the accident.  As a result 
of the analysis of the facts learned during the course of the nearly 3-year long investigation of the accident, the 
Safety Board determined that the probable cause of the accident was, “the in-flight separation of the vertical 
stabilizer as a result of the loads beyond ultimate design that were created by the first officer’s unnecessary and 
excessive rudder pedal inputs.  Contributing to these rudder pedal inputs were characteristics of the Airbus A300-
600 rudder system design and elements of the American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program22.”  
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